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Recent Cases
FEDERAL PRACTICE-ARTIFICIAL CREATION OF
DIVERSITY REJECTED BY THIRD CIRCUIT
McSparran v. Weist, 402 F.2d 867 (3d Cir. 1968)
The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit recently held that
federal jurisdiction does not exist where a straw or nominal fidu-
ciary has been appointed for the purpose of creating diversity of
citizenship.' In so holding, the circuit court overruled its previous
decisions which had held that the motive behind the appointment
of a fiduciary was an irrelevant consideration in determining the
validity of artificially created federal diversity jurisdiction.
2
Richard R. Reignor, a minor, was injured in an automobile
accident on November 27, 1966, in Berks County, Pennsylvania. In
January, 1967, Reignor petitioned the Orphan's Court of Berks
County for the appointment of a guardian of his estate. The only
funds which the guardian was to receive were those obtained by
suit or settlement in an action which the proposed out-of-state
guardian was to institute in the district court. On February 6,
1967, the orphan's court appointed Stella McSparran as "guard-
ian" of the estate.3 It was conceded by plaintiff's counsel that the
1. McSparran v. Weist, 402 F.2d 867 (3d Cir. 1968).
2. Corabi v. Auto Racing, Inc., 264 F.2d 784 (3d Cir. 1959); Jaffe v.
Philadelphia & Western R. Co., 180 F.2d 1010 (3d Cir. 1950). The Mc-
Sparran decision also disapproved Fallat v. Gouran, 220 F.2d 325 (3d Cir.
1955) to the extent that the Fallat decision indicated approval of "manu-
factured" diversity.
3. McSparran v. Weist, 402 F.2d 867 at 868 (3d Cir. 1968). In Kauf-
man Estate, 4 Fiduc. Rep. 253 (1954), the Philadelphia Orphan's Court
hesitated to appoint a nonresident guardian since it usually limited appoint-
ment to those within the court's jurisdiction. The court made the appoint-
ment, however, since the court determined higher jury verdicts could be
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guardian was a straw party, chosen solely to create diversity juris-
diction. 4 Suit was instituted in federal court by the guardian on
behalf of the minor.
The general grant of federal diversity jurisdiction in 28 U.S.C.
§ 1332(a) (1), is limited by 28 U.S.C. § 1359. Section 1359 provides
that "a district court shall not have jurisdiction of a civil action in
which any party by assignment or otherwise, has been improperly
or collusively made or joined to invoke the jurisdiction of such
court."5 The question before the third circuit in McSparran in-
volved the applicability of section 1359 to a case in which an out-of-
state guardian was admittedly appointed for the sole purpose of
creating diversity jurisdiction.
The imprecise language of section 1359 and in similar language
of prior statutes6 has caused the federal courts great difficulty
in cases where diversity is artifically created. Courts have vari-
ously suggested that section 1359 does not apply, that diversity
can be defeated without application of 1359, that section 1359 de-
feats federal jurisdiction of some but not all appointments of out-
of-state fiduciaries, and that 1359 defeats federal jurisdiction of
all cases involving artificially created jurisdiction regardless of how
the fiduciary is appointed.
Before McSparran, the third circuit had construed the lan-
guage of section 1359 very strictly, so that federal jurisdiction was
obtained by the appointment of out-of-state fiduciaries. In Corabi
v. Auto Racing, Inc., a resident administratrix resigned her position
to permit the appointment of a non-resident administratrix for
the express purpose of creating diversity of citizenship between
the parties. In holding that the appointment of the administrator
was not improper or collusive under section 1359, the third circuit
stated:
The statute used the phrase "improperly or collusively" to
obtained in a federal court and the financial benefit of the ward was the
court's primary concern. But see Johnson, Minor, 3 Pa. Fiduc. Rep. 327
(O.C. Dela. 1953) where the local court refused to remove a guardian who
had been appointed to create diversity.
4. McSparran v. Weist, 402 F.2d 867 (3d Cir. 1968). The Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure provide that a representative of a minor has the
capacity to sue on behalf of the minor. F.R.C.P. 17c. This rule does
not establish any standards for the determination of diversity and does
not effect the jurisdiction of federal courts. F.R.C.P. 82. See also Appelt v.
Whitty, 286 F.2d 135 (7th Cir. 1961).
5. 28 U.S.C. § 1359.
6. For the history of section 1359 see the discussions in McSparran v.
Weist, 402 F.2d 867 (3d Cir. 1968) and Ferrara v. Philadelphia Laboratores,
Inc., 272 F. Supp. 1000 (D. Vt. 1967), aff'd on opinion below, 293 F.2d 934
(2d Cir. 1968).
characterize the manufacture or joinder prohibited by it.
The word "collusion" is a strong one. The term "collusion"
indicates "a secret agreement or deceitful purpose; deceit;
fraud." Webster's New International Dictionary, 2 ed ...
Certainly, to make use of state law to obtain diversity jur-
isdiction even though the object may be a high verdict
in federal court is not collusive within the ordinary mean-
ing of that term. Moreover, the word "collusion" gen-
erally is employed to indicate an illegal agreement or under-
standing between opposing sides of a litigation rather than
to an arrangement effected by one, side of the sort at bar.
Here the plaintiff'sside of the case acted for what it deemed
to be its own benefit. . . . The .word "improperly" clearly
connotes impropriety. We cannot perceive that here. Had
Congress intended to prohibit the creation of federal di-
versity jurisdiction under such circumstances as those at
bar it could have done so simply by omitting the words
"improperly or collusively."
The court held that motive for the appointment was an irrelevant
consideration in determining the applicability of section 1359 to a
given case. It was felt that this interpretation was supported by,
the holdings and dictum of earlier federal cases. 7 As long as the
out-of-state guardian had the capacity to sue, his citizenship
would control. Access to the federal courts accordingly has been
gained by the appointment of out-of-state guardians of minors,8
incompetents, 9 representatives under wrongful death statutes, 10 and
administrators of estates."
In Martineau v. City of St. Paul,12 the eighth circuit was con-
cerned with a similar case involving the artificial creation of fed-
eral jurisdiction. A court approved out-of-state guardian brought
suit on behalf of a minor; it was held that since the minor was the
real party in interest, his citizenship would control, thereby elimi-
nating diversity.' 3 The court also stated that a ". . Probate Court
of Minnesota, by appointing a non-resident as a guardian for a
Minnesota minor, cannot transmute what is purely a local contro-
versy into one between citizens of different states . ... 4 The
Martineau decision did not, however, discuss the collusive nature
7. E.g., Mecom v. Fitzsimmons Drilling Co., 284 U.S. 183 (1931); Black
& White Taxicab & Transfer Co. v. Brown & Yellow Taxicab & Transfer Co.,
276 U.S. 518, 524 (1928). Both cases were, however, distinguished and found
inapplicable to the McSparran case.
8. E.g., Stephan v. Martin Firearms Co., 325 F.2d 238 (2d Cir. 1963).
9. E.g., Fallat v. Gouran, 220 F.2d 325 (3d Cir. 1955).
10. E.g., County of Todd v. Loegering, 297 F.2d 470 (8th Cir. 1961);
Rodriguez v. Wheeler, 16 F.R.D. 103 (S.D. Tex. 1954).
11. E.g., Lang v. Elm City Constr. Co., 324 F.2d 235 (2d Cir. 1963);
Corabi v. Auto Racing, Inc., 264 F.2d 784 (3d Cir. 1959); Erwin v. Barrow,
217 F.2d 522 (10th Cir. 1954); Jaffe v. Philadelphia & Western R. Co., 180 F.2d
1010 (3d Cir. 1950).
12. 172 F.2d 777 (8th Cir. 1949).
13. But see, Mexican Central Railway Co. v. Eckman, 187 U.S. 429
(1903); County of Todd v. Loegering, 297 F.2d 470 (8th Cir. 1961).
14. Martineau v. City of St. Paul, 172 F.2d 777 at 780 (8th Cir. 1949).
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of the appointment of the out-of-state fiduciary.
While a few earlier cases had suggested that the appointment
of an out-of-state fiduciary was collusive,15 much of the criticism
of the artificial creation of diversity was confined to texts1 6
and law review articles. 17 Recently, however, the second circuit
has considered the applicability of section 1359 to a case involving
an assignment of a claim to an out-of-state fiduciary. In Ferrara
v. Philadelphia Laboratories, Inc.,18 the second circuit affirmed a
lower court decision which had held that section 1359 would pre-
vent the assignment of a personal injury claim to a non-resident
trustee for the purpose of creating diversity. The court in Ferrara
made it quite clear, however, that had the out-of-state fiduciary
been appointed or controlled by the state probate court pursuant to
statute, as in Corabi, jurisdiction would have been sustained.19
Since the assignment had been arranged by the ultimate bene-
15. E.g., Cerri v. Akron-People's Telphone Co., 219 F. 285 (D.C.N.D.
Ohio 1914). Cf. Lehigh Mining & Mfg. Co. v. Kelly, 160 U.S. 827 (1895);
Campbell v. Pacific Fruit Express Co., 148 F. Supp. 209 (Idaho 1957).
16. E.g., 8 A. MooRE's FEDERAL PRACTICE 17.05[3-3] (1968).
17. See Cohan and Tate, "Manufacturing Federal Diversity by the
Appointment of Representatives: Its Legality and Propriety," 1 VML. L. REV.
201 (1956).
The American Law Institute has proposed the following amendment to
Title 28, USC:
An executor or an administrator, or any person representing
the estate of a decedent or appointed pursuant to statute with
authority to bring an action because of the death of a decedent
shall be deemed to be a citizen only of the same State as the
decedent; and a guardian committee, or other like representative
of an infant or incompetent shall be deemed to be a citizen only
of the same State as the person represented.
ALI, Study of the Division of Jurisdiction Between State and Federal Courts
(Official Draft, 1965) Pt. 1, App. B, 170, 175.
The ALI has also suggested that § 1359 be replaced by a section stating:
(a) A district court shall not have jurisdiction of a civil action in
which any party has been made or joined improperly, or collu-
sively, or pursuant to agreement or understanding between op-
posing parties, in order to invoke the jurisdiction of such court.
(b) Whenever an object of a sale, assignment, or other transfer of
the whole or any part of any interest in a claim or any other
property has been to enable or to prevent the invoking of federal
jurisdiction under this chapter or chapter 158 of this title, juris-
diction of a civil action shall be determined as if such sale,
assignment or other transfer had not occurred. The word "trans-
fer" as used in this section includes the appointment of a trustee,
receiver or other fiduciary, or of any other person to hold or re-
ceive interest of any kind, whether made by private persons or by
a court or any other official.
Id. Proposed § 1307, Draft.
18. 272 F. Supp. 1000 (D. Vt. 1967), aff'd on opinion below, 293 F.2d 934
(2d Cir. 1968).
19. Ferrara v. Philadelphia Laboratories, Inc., 272 F. Supp. 1000 at n.7
(D. Vt. 1967), aff'd on opinion below, 293 F.2d 934 (2d Cir. 1968).
ficiaries and not imposed by statute or the state probate court,
jurisdiction would not be proper. The distinction was made to
avoid a collateral attack by the federal courts on the validity of a
state probate court's appointment of an out-of-state fiduciary. If
the appointment was made solely by the beneficiaries, the court
felt no problem of collateral attack would be present and the
federal court could refuse to recognize the appointment for diver-
sity purposes.
20
Last year, the fifth circuit similarly held in Carribean Mills,
Inc. v. Kramer,2 1 that a federal court had no jurisdiction of an
action brought by an assignee to whom an assignment was made
for the purpose of creating diversity. While the case was dis-
tinguishable from Corabi as the appointment was made by the
ultimate beneficiaries, the court was unmistakable in its criticism
of Corabi. The court in the Carribean Mills decision stated:
By focusing on the literal meanings of the two words, the
court virtually emasculated the statute, for it is doubtful
that any of the cases under consideration reflect collusion
in the sense of fraud or deceit, collusion with the opposing
party, or impropriety in the sense of indecorum or inde-
cency. . . . If the statute is to have any utility, its meaning
must be derived from the prerevision statutes and cases,
not from dictionary definitions of the individual words ...
Hence, an attempt to create federal jurisdiction by color-
able assignment or other device without substance is "im-
proper or collusive" within the meaning of the statute.;
2
At the time the McSparran case was argued, therefore, the
third circuit had the benefit of at least. four district views con-
cerning the validity of jurisdiction in cases involving the appoint-
ment of out-of-state fiduciaries: first, the Corabi decision that
section 1359 did not preclude jurisdiction; second, the Martineau
holding that the citizenship of the real party in interest controlled
without concern for the collusive nature of the suit; third, the view
that any attempt by the ultimate beneficiaries to create diversity
without the benefit of state court appointment would be subject
to attack as suggested in Ferrara; and four, the view that any
attempt to create jurisdiction by a device without substance was
barred under section 1359 as suggested by the language of Mc-
Sparran. The court properly overruled its prior holdings and ap-
plied section 1359 to a case involving the artificial creation of
diversity.
Federal courts have an affirmative duty to scrutinize their
own jurisdiction and they should consider the congressional policy
"of jealous restriction, of avoiding offense to state sensitiveness,
and of relieving the federal courts of the overwhelming burden
20. Id.
21. 392 F.2d 387 (5th Cir. 1968).
22. Carribean Mills, Inc. v. Kramer, 392 F.2d 387 (5th Cir. 1968), cert.
denied, 89 S. Ct. 99 (1968).
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of 'business that intrinsically belongs to the state courts.' "2 The
over-crowded federal courts do not have the time or the facilities
to be bothered with cases which are essentially local.24 There is
no fear in this type of case that the plaintiff might be prejudiced
in the state court. The interpretation of section 1359 in Corabi
was entirely too strict and circumvented the congressional intent
to limit federal jurisdiction.
The Martineau decision did not deal with the precise issue that
arose in McSparran and for this reason the third circuit recognized
but did not rely on its reasoning to defeat jurisdiction.25 The
reasoning suggested in Ferrara that a distinction should be made
in those cases in which a state court appoints the out-of-state
fiduciary was properly avoided in McSparran. An ultimate bene-
ficiary should not be permitted to go to a state court to avoid
congressional mandate concerning federal jurisdiction. 6 The re-
fusal of a federal court to sanction a state court appointed fi-
duciary for diversity purposes is not a collateral attack 27 as earlier
suggested. 28 If the appointment of a fiduciary was collusive, the
federal court will merely refuse to recognize his citizenship for
diversity purposes, but in all other respects his powers remain.
The McSparran decision does not answer all the questions in-
volved in this highly confused area of federal jurisdiction.29 The
23. City of Indianapolis v. Chase National Bank, 314 U.S. 63 at 76 (1941).
See also Lehigh Mining & Mfg. Co. v. Kelly, 160 U.S. 327 (1895); Martineau
v. City of St. Paul, 172 F.2d 777 (8th Cir. 1949); cf. Pure Oil Co. v. Puritan
Oil Co., 127 F.2d 6 (2d Cir. 1942); Steinburg v. Toro, 95 F. Supp. at 791
(D.C.P.R. 1951).
24. See generally Wright, The Federal Courts-A Century After Appo-
mattox, 52 A.B.A.J. 742 (1966). An American Law Institute study indicated
that twenty per cent of diversity cases filed in the Eastern District of Penn-
sylvania during 1958 and 1959 were instituted by out-of-state personal
representatives. See American Law Institute, Study of the Division of Juris-
diction Between State and Federal Courts (Part I), pp. 170-77 (Official
Draft 1965).
25. The Court of Appeals properly stated:
These decisions [including Martineau] deal with the party whose
citizenship is to be the test in the determination of the existence
of diversity. They do not decide the problem now before us, the
effect of the artificial creation or "manufacture" of diversity.
McSparran v. Weist, 402 F.2d 867 at 871 (3d Cir. 1968).
26. See dictum in Martineau v. City of St. Paul, 172 F.2d 777 (8th Cir.
1949).
27. See McSparran v. Weist, 402 F.2d 867 at 874 (3d Cir. 1968).
28. E.g., Mecom v. Fitzsimmons Drilling Co., Inc., 284 U.S. 183 (1931);
Corabi v. Auto Racing, Inc., 264 F.2d 784 (3d Cir. 1959); Jaffe v. Philadelphia
& Western R. Co., 180 F.2d 1010 (3d Cir. 1950).
29. One unanswered question involves the effect of the appointment of
an out-of-state representative to defeat jurisdiction. See Mecom v. Fitz-
simmons Drilling Co., 284 U.S. 183 (1931). In Mecom it was held that mo-
tive was irrelevant in the consideration of the artificial creation of lack of
United States Supreme Court is currently considering the effect
of the artificial creation of diversity. It is submitted that the rea-
soning of the McSparran decision should be followed. It would
then be the duty of the federal district court to determine whether
diversity was artificially created in a given case.80 If so, the
case will be dismissed in the federal court with proper remedy in
the state court.
JoHr B. MArcxc
diversity. Since § 1359 does not express a policy against defeating federal
jurisdiction, section 1359 does not apply and the reasoning of McSparran is
inapplicable. The language of Martineau v. City of St. Paul, 172 F.2d 777
(8th Cir. 1949) might, however, be applicable in preventing the artificial
defeat of jurisdiction.
30. McSparran v. Weist, 402 F.2d 867 at 876 (3d Cir. 1968).
VERTICAL PRIVITY ABOLISHED-PURCHASER MAY
RECOVER FROM REMOTE MANUFACTURER
FOR BREACH OF WARRANTY
Kassab v. Central Soya, 432 Pa. 217, 246 A.2d 848 (1968)
In Kassab v. Central Soya' the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
reconsidered a firmly established rule which it had recently
affirmed in Miller v. Preitiz.2 Kassab held that a purchaser'ss
assumpsit action for breach of warranty against a remote manu-
facturer is no longer barred by lack of "vertical privity." In over-
ruling this portion of Miller, the court joined the growing list of
jurisdictions that have eliminated the privity requirement in con-
tract actions by purchasers against remote manufacturers.4
Plaintiff, a cattle breeder, ordered feed from co-defendant
Pritts. Preparing the feed according to a previously used form-
ula, Pritts used an ingredient, "Cattle Blend," supplied by Central
Soya. After being fed the supposedly properly mixed feed, plain-
tiff's cows began to abort, and his breed bull became sterile. Later
analysis of the feed indicated that the feed supplement "Cattle
Blend" contained stilbestrol.5 Plaintiff instituted an action for
1. 432 Pa. 217, 246 A.2d 848 (1968).
2. 422 Pa. 383, 221 A.2d 320 (1966). Decedent's estate brought two
counts for the death resulting from an injury by an exploding vaporizer
purchased by the decedent's aunt. On the second count the representative
could not maintain any action against either the distributor or the manu-
facturer due to lack of privity between the purchaser and them.
3. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 2-318 (1953). A seller's warranty whether
express or implied extends to any natural person who is in the family or
household of the buyer or who is a guest in his home if it is reasonable to
expect that such person may use, consume or be affected by the goods
and who is injured in person by breach of the warranty.
4. See, e.g., Gherne v. Ford Motor Co., 246 Cal. App. 2d 639, 55 Cal.
Rptr. 94 (1966); Smith v. Platt Motors, Inc., 137 So. 2d 239 (Fla. App. 1962);
State Farm Mutual Auto Ins. Co. v. Anderson-Weber, Inc., 252 Iowa 1289,
110 N.W.2d 449 (1961); Chandler v. Anchor Serum Co., 198 Kan. 571, 426
P.2d 82 (1967); Spence v. Three Rivers Builders & Masonry Supply, Inc., 353
Mich. 120, 90 N.W.2d 873 (1958); Morrow v. Caloric Appliance Corp., 372 S.W.
2d 41 (Mo. 1963); Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 161
A.2d 69 1960; Randy Knitwear v. American Cyanamid Co., 11 N.Y.2d 5, 181
NE.2d 399, 226 N.Y.S.2d 363 (1962); Land v. General Motors Corp., 136
N.W.2d 805 (N.D. 1965); General Motors Corp. v. Dodson, 47 Tenn. App. 438,
338 S.W.2d 655 (1960); Ford Motor Co. v. Grimes, 408 S.W.2d 313 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1966); cf. Hempstead v. General Fire Extinguisher Corp., 269 F.
Supp. 109 (D. Del. 1967) (applying Va. law); Graham v. John R. Watts &
Son, 238 Ky. 96, 36 S.W.2d 859 (1931).
5. Stilbestrol is customarily added to feed for beef cattle since it has a
tendency to make cattle gain weight. Yet, it is a synthetic hormone which
breach of implied warranty of merchantability and fitness for a
particular purpose7 against both the seller, Pritts, and the manu-
facturer, Central Soya. The trial judge, sitting without a jury,
announced a verdict for defendants and stated that although he
found stilbestrol present in the feed he believed the defendant's
expert that the amoung of drug in the feed could not have caused
abortions and sterility. From that verdict, plaintiff appealed.8
The common law view was that a purchaser could bring an
action in contract only against a party with whom he dealt. Since
such action was based on warranty, and the warranty was deemed
personal to the original buyer, only the original buyer could assert
this right for breach of warranty." Therefore, any contract action
against the remote party was precluded by the privity require-
ment.'0
Under this view, a plaintiff's rights in contract depended on
his satisfaction of cumulative criteria necessary to establish a
cause of action for breach of warranty. These criteria were "hori-
zontal privity" and "vertical privity." Horizontal privity relates
to the consumer chain and involves the question of who besides
the immediate purchaser" should have a cause of action for dam-
ages sustained through the use of a defective product. Vertical
privity is the requirement of direct dealings with the defendant
and thus involves the question of the extent of the purchaser's
rights beyond the immediate seller. As reinforced in Miller, the
traditional view requiring vertical privity proved to be both in-
equitable and bothersome. It was inequitable because the plain-
tiff might be precluded from real recovery by restriction to an ac-
tion against an impecunious defendant. This procedure was bother-
some because each remote party could be required to indemnify
its immediate purchaser in the event the retail seller was held
liable in the initial action. 12 This needless circuity of actions ham-
tends to accentuate the female characteristics in animals, including heat and
abortions in cows and sterility in bulls. In fact, federal law requires it to
be properly labeled and warn the purchaser not to feed it to breeders. See
CODE FED. REGS. tit. 21 § 121.241 (1963).
6. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 2-314 (1953).
7. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 2-315 (1953).
8. In holding that lack of vertical privity between the manufacturer
and the remote purchaser would no longer shelter the manufacturer from
liability for a breach of warranty, the court recognized a problem with the
assessment of damages but suggested recovery could be allowed for diminu-
tion of the cattle herd's value provided such diminution was proximately
caused by the breach. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, 2-715-b (1953); Kassab v.
Central Soya, 432 Pa. 217, 236, 246 A.2d 848, 857 (1968).
9. Hochgertel v. Canada Dry Corp., 409 Pa. 610, 187 A.2d 575 (1963).
10. See cases cited and explained note 2 supra.
11. One having achieved the "horizontal privity" criteria under statute
in note 3 supra, or as extended by case law. There has been no such
extension of this statute to a mere user of the product. Hochertel v.
Canada Dry Corp., 409 Pa. 610, 187 A.2d 575 (1963).
12. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 2-607-5-a (1953) provides that upon giving
Recent Cases
DICKINSON LAW REVIEW
pered both courts and parties. 3
Ironically, on the same day as the Miller decision, another
significant change was added to this area. The adoption, in Webb
v. Zern,14 of section 402a of Restatement of Torts 2d 15 as the law of
Pennsylvania obviated the requirement of proof of negligence in
tort actions. Although it presented problems, the traditional view
had been based on the sound policy of relieving a remote party
from strict liability in contract since such party could not have been
liable in tort without proof of negligence:
Under the Uniform Commercial Code, once a breach
of warranty has been shown, the defendant's liability,
assuming . . . proximate cause and damages, is absolute.
Lack of negligence on the seller's part is no defense. There-
fore, prior to the adoption of section 402a, . . . to dispense
with privity would be to allow recovery in contract with-
out proof of negligence, while requiring a showing of neg-
ligence . . . in tort. To permit the result of a lawsuit
to depend solely on the caption... has never been, a sound
resolution. . . .16
After Webb's adoption of 402a, a plaintiff could proceed in tort
without proof of negligence and privity. The symmetrical bal-
ance was broken and the Webb-Miller dicothomy was formed.
In a case based on similar facts the mere change on the caption of
the complaint would cause opposite results to be reached.17 If A
purchased from B a defective product produced by C, and sus-
notice to his immediate seller, a retail seller will have bound such other
party whether he comes in to defend or otherwise. This procedure will not
alleviate circuity of actions but wil only bind the manufacturer vis-a-vis his
immediate buyer when notice is given. As a merely permissive procedure,
it does not give the original buyer any direct recourse against the remote
party.
13. Miller v. Preitz, 422 Pa. 383, 413, 221 A.2d 320, 335 (1966) (dissent-
ing and concurring opinion).
14. 422 Pa. 424, 220 A.2d 853 (1966).
15. (1) One who sells any product in a defective condition un-
reasonably dangerous to the user or consumer or to his property
is subject to liability for physical harm thereby caused to the ulti-
mate user or consumer, or to his property, if (a) the seller is
engaged in the business of selling such a product, and (b) it is ex-
pected to and does reach the user or consumer without substantial
change in the condition in which it was sold. (2) the rule stated
in subsection (1) applies although (a) the seller has exercised all
possible care in the preparation and sale of his product, and (b)
the user or consumer has not bought the product from or en-
tered into any contractual relation with the seller.
16. Kassab v. Central Soya, 432 Pa. 217, 228-29, 246 A.2d 848, 853
(1968).
17. In Webb, a tort action adopting § 402a of Restatement Torts 2d, the
party injured by an exploding beer keg recovered against the remote manu-
facturer; in Miller, an assumpsit action decided under the Uniform Com-
mercial Code, the estate of the party killed by an exploding vaporizer could
not recover against the remote manufacturer.
tained damages resulting from use of the product, he could pro-
ceed in tort on "strict liability" (assuming remaining require-
ments of 402a are met); yet, on the same facts A could not main-
tain an action in contract for breach of warranty against C.
The ultimate justice, equity, and reason of Kassab is illus-
trated by Justice Roberts as he denounced privity and the anom-
aly it created:
When it is considered that continued adherence to the
requirement of vertical privity results merely in perpetu-
ating a needless chain of actions, . . . and in memorializing
the unwarranted notion that a change in the caption of
a complaint completely alter the result, our course be-
comes well marked.18
With the advent of Kassab, tort and contract again moves to a
more symmetrical plane. It appears that a few sharp divergences
exist in the areas of statute of limitations, the difficulty of proving
a product defective 9 as compared to unmerchantable, 20 and the
status of a mere user of a product. 21 Nevertheless, Kassab will
give renewed vigor to the use of contract actions for breach of
warranty and together with 402a offer a two pronged remedy
against a remote manufacturer.
RONALD J. MISHKIN
18. Kassab v. Central Soya, 432 Pa. 217, 234, 246 A.2d 848, 856 (1968)
(emphasis added).
19. See note 15 supra.
20. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 2-314-2 (1953).




United Stations v. Getty Oil Co., 102 N.J. Super. 459,
246 A.2d 150 (1968).
In United Stations v. Getty Oil Co.' the Chancery Division of
the New Jersey Superior Court enjoined as unfair competition the
use of contests and games2 in connection with the sale of gasoline
within plaintiff's competitive area. The contests violated a New
Jersey statute regulating the sale of motor fuels.4 Upon proof of
the violation and of consequential injury to plaintiff's business, a
common law action of unfair competition was made out5 and the
injunction issued.
To grant an injunction for such a common law action, the
plaintiff must show (1) an illegal act by defendant, and (2) con-
sequential injury to the person or property of plaintiff.6 Once
these prerequisites are established, an injunction will issue even
though an equity proceeding will usually not lie to enjoin a crim-
inal act.7 Otherwise, an injured businessman would be forced to
1. 102 N.J. Super. 459, 246 A.2d 150 (1968).
2. From the time of the filing of the complaint to the trial, the names
of the various games sponsored by the defendant retailers and companies
changed, as new series began. Generally, the games are similarly operated.
Contest tickets or slips are given to a contestant, usually when he appears at
the service station. If a contestant obtains matching tickets he wins a mone-
tary prize. No purchase is necessary to obtain a ticket, although a winner
has to go to a participating dealer to claim his prize. No skill is required on
the contestant's part, and the winners are chosen entirely by chance. Id. at
467, 246 A.2d at 154. Hearings before the House Select Small Business,
Subcommittee on Activities of Regulatory Agencies Relating to Small Busi-
ness, reported in 24 CQ ALMANAC 679 (1968), indicate that selection is
possibly not made entirely by chance, as testimony indicated that some re-
tail dealers are given a "win ticket" to give to choice customers in games of
this type, thus obtaining some quick winners.
3. The court concluded from the evidence that plaintiff's competitive
area would be Orange and West Orange, New Jersey, consequently the in-
junction was limited to those areas.
4. N.J. STAT. ANN. 56:6-2(f) (1964). The pertinent portion of the
statute reads:
An act to regulate the sale of motor fuels. It shall be unlawful
for any retail dealer to use lotteries, prizes, wheels of fortune,
punch-boards or other games of chance, in connection with the
sale of motor fuels.
5. United Stations v. Getty Oil Co., 102 N.J. Super. 459, 466, 246 A.2d
150, 153 (1968).
6. United-Detroit Theaters Corp. v. Colonial Theatrical Enterprises,
Inc., 280 Mich. 425, 273 N.W. 756 (1937).
7. The leading case substantiating this position is In re Debs, 158 U.S.
593 (1895).
watch his business falter because of a competitor's actions until
law enforcement officials moved to prosecute the competitor for
his illegal activities.8 The theory of plaintiff's suit in Getty was
that the contests were lotteries or games of chance. Hence they
were illegal within the meaning of the statute's prohibition. By
conducting the games in violation of the statute the defendants
were engaging in unfair competition to his injury.9 Finding in-
jury was not difficult at trial.'0 The principal question was
whether the games constituted lotteries.
Initially, a lottery may be defined as a chance for a prize for a
price." Lotteries per se have long been regarded as detrimental
to the public good since they cater to one's gambling instincts by
the lure of getting something for nothing. 12  Using this lure to
attract customers is understandably frowned upon by the better
elements of the business community.'3 Yet, contests, games and
lotteries are used by businesses in a myriad of forms to attract
customers to a tradesman's wares. 14 Seemingly, when one game is
declared illegal as a lottery two more spring up to take its place.' 5
Whether a particular contest in the promotion of business is a
lottery depends upon the presence of three elements. It is uni-
versally held that the three essentials of a lottery are consideration,
chance and prize.' 6 Of these, chance and prize are most easily
discernible by the courts.17 The most difficult question is whether
the contestant paid a consideration for his chance to win the prize.
There is a split of authority as to what constitutes sufficient
8. Glover v. Malloska, 238 Mich. 216, 213 N.W. 107 (1927). The in-
junctive relief is especially vital in Getty, as the state Attorney General's
Office had previously expressed the opinion that the contests in question
were not violative of state law. United Stations v. Getty Oil Co., 102 N.J.
Super. 459, 473, 246 A.2d 150, 158 (1968).
9. Id. at 466, 246 A.2d at 153.
10. Plaintiff had in the past participated in a gasoline game sponsored
by Mobile. "Plaintiff's proofs show that before he participated in Mobile's
initial giveaway contest in the fall of 1966, he was pumping an average of
26,000 to 27,000 gallons of gasoline monthly. During the period of his
participation, he experienced an increase in sales. Upon his discontinuance
of the game, plaintiff's gallonage declined, and the trend continued down-
ward while competitors conducted games to where his gallonage has leveled
to an average of approximately 22,000 gallons monthly." Id. at 476, 247
A.2d at 159.
11. Iris Amusement Corp. v. Kelly, 366 Ill. 256, 8 N.E.2d 648 (1937).
12. For a succinct history of lotteries and lottery statutes, see Cudd v.
Aschenbrenner, 233 Ore. 272, 377 P.2d 150 (1962). See also Minter v. Fed-
eral Trade Commission, 102 F.2d 69, 72 (3d Cir. 1939): "Yet no one will
doubt that gambling may easily become a passion scarcely less irresistible
and less injurious than drink."
13. Minter v. Federal Trade Commission, 102 F.2d 69 (3d Cir. 1939).
14. For a listing of various games or lotteries see 1 CALLMAN, UNFAIR
COMPETITION, TRADEMARKS AND MONOPOLIES § 31 nn. 29-36 (1967).
15. Reda, Lotteries as a Business Promotion, 23 Omo ST. L.J. 698
(1962).
16. 34 AM. JuR. Lotteries § 8 (1941); 54 C.J.S. Lotteries § 2 (1954).
17. Cudd v. Aschenbrenner, 233 Ore. 272, 377 P.2d 150 (1962).
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consideration to establish a business contest as a lottery. Three
approaches are used by the courts, which indicate the breadth
of the legal spectrum on this question. Some courts find that the
consideration which will support a lottery is the same consideration
which would support a simple contract; that is, benefit to the
businessman or detriment to the customer.18 Other states hold
that an expectation of increased patronage is sufficient 9 as indirect
consideration. Finally, some states hold that something more is
necessary; that is, a valuable consideration must be paid in money
for the chance to win the prize.
20
The question of consideration was central to finding a lottery
in Getty. Defendant oil companies claimed that the games were not
lotteries or games of chance within the statute's prohibition be-
cause no purchase was necessary to obtain a contest ticket." In
short, no consideration was paid for the chance to win. Although
this contention was not pressed at trial,22 the court disposed of it
easily and concluded that the games were in fact games of chance.23
It is the court's novel approach to this conclusion that deserves
investigation. The court found that as the statute is a regulatory
statute for the sale of gasoline,24 the question of whether the con-
tests constitute games of chance within its terms should be viewed
only from this regulatory and competitive aspect. Even without
consideration, the contests could be games of chance within such a
regulatory statute. The absence of consideration only makes the
18. Affiliated Enterprises, Inc. v. Waller, 40 Del. 28, 5 A.2d 257 (1939);
Lucky Calendar Co. v. Cohn, 19 N.J. 399, 117 A.2d 487 (1955); Furst v. A. & G.
Amusement Co., 128 N.J.L. 311, 25 A.2d 892 (1942).
19. Sproat-Temple Theatre Corp. v. Colonial Theatrical Enterprises,
Inc., 276 Mich. 127, 267 N.W. 602 (1936); State v. Berger, 126 N.J.L. 39, 17
A.2d 167 (1941); Featherstone v. Independent Service Station Ass'n of Texas,
10 S.W.2d 124 (Tex. Civ. App. 1928); Maughs v. Porter, 157 Va. 415, 161
S.E. 242 (1931); State v. Danz, 140 Wash. 546, 250 P. 37 (1926); Society
Theatre v. City of Seattle, 118 Wash. 258, 203 P. 21 (1922).
20. California Gasoline Retailers v. Regal Petroleum Corp. of Fresno,
Inc., 50 Cal. 2d 844, 330 P.2d 778 (1958); State v. Hundling, 220 Iowa 1369,
264 N.W. 608 (1936); State v. Bussiere, 155 Me. 331, 154 A.2d 702 (1959);
Commonwealth v. Wall, 295 Mass. 70, 3 N.E.2d 28 (1936); State ex rel. Staf-
ford v. Theatre Corp., 114 Mont. 52, 132 P.2d 689 (1942); City of Roswell v.
Jones, 41 N.M. 258, 67 P.2d 286, 290 (1937) ("Profit accruing remotely or in-
directly to the person who gives the prize is not a substitute for the require-
ment that he who has the chance to win the prize must pay a valuable
consideration therefore, in order to make the scheme a lottery."); Cudd v.
Aschenbrenner, 233 Ore. 272, 377 P.2d 150 (1962).
21. See note 2 supra.
22. United Stations v. Getty Oil Co., 102 N.J. Super. 459, 467, 246 A.2d
150, 154 (1968).
23. Id. at 468, 246 A.2d at 155.
24. See note 4 supra.
game more attractive to customers from a competitive viewpoint.25
The court therefore seems to say that the very existence of a con-
test constitutes unfair competition.
This position may be true in theory, but the proposition that
consideration is not needed to create a lottery, even from a purely
competitive point of view, finds little or no support in state courts.
Unfair competition actions by the Federal Trade Commission
2 6
could substantiate this position,2 7 but even here and in the absence
of consideration, the reason a cease and desist order issues against
a particular game is not merely because a game is played, but be-
cause any type of game that even closely approaches being a lottery
is void as against public policy.
28
In Getty, the court recognized its lack of support and did not
rely solely upon the above reasoning. The court stated, "...
assuming arguendo that consideration is required . . . [by] requir-
ing the participant to visit the retail dealer's premises, the dealer
receives consideration in the expectation that this lure will result in
an increase in his motor fuel sales." 29 By its arguendo discussion,
the court establishes a more solid ground for its decision. This is
especially true in view of the fact that all the cases cited by the
court to support its decision that these contests were games of
chance, also found consideration of some sort to constitute and
complete the requirements for a lottery.80
25. United Stations v. Getty Oil Co., 102 N.J. Super. 459, 468, 246 A.2d
150, 155 (1968). "[F]rom a competitive aspect, consideration in a lottery or
the like is not only an insignificant element but its absence renders the game
device much more effective in attracting attention." The court cites 1
CALLMAN, UNFAIR COMPETITION, TRADEMARKS AND MONOPOLIES § 31 (1967) as
authority. This is Callman's position, but he does not cite authority for his
statement.
26. The statutory authority is the Federal Trade Commission Act, 15
U.S.C.A. § 45 (1963). The pertinent provision reads: "Unfair methods of
competition in commerce and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in com-
merce, are hereby declared unlawful."
27. See, e.g., Modernistic Candies, Inc. v. Federal Trade Commission,
145 F.2d 454 (7th Cir. 1944). The court affirmed an FTC cease and desist
order against the manufacture of "bailgum boards." Boards were not com-
plete in themselves as lottery devices, but the court held that the order
should stand. The boards were designed to encourage games of chance used
in conjunction with sale of merchandise.
28. See 1 CALLMAN, UNFAIR COMPETITION, TRADEMARKS AND MONOPOLIES
§ 31 n.43 (1967).
29. United Stations v. Getty Oil Co., 102 N.J. Super. 459, 468, 246 A.2d
150, 155 (1968).
30. Id. at 468, 246 A.2d at 155, citing Lucky Calendar Co. v. Cohn, 19
N.J. 399, 117 A.2d 487 (1955) (consideration found in necessity of customer's
depositing coupon at business establishment), and Jones v. Smith Oil & Re-
fining Co., 295 Ill. App. 519, 15 N.E.2d 42 (1938) (that consideration was paid
by some customers controls); Glover v. Malloska, 238 Mich. 216, 213 N.W. 107
(1927) (same); Furst v. A. & G. Amusement Co., 128 N.J.L. 311, 25 A.2d 892
(1942) (consideration founded in simple contract theory of benefit and detri-
ment); Featherstone v. Independent Service Station Ass'n of Texas, 10 S.W.
124 (Tex. Civ. App. 1928) (consideration through increased patronage).
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Selling goods by means of a contest or game which appeals in
any manner to the gambling instincts of a customer is "unfair
competition." This is true even if all the requisite elements of a
lottery cannot be made out.3 ' These games only serve to divert
the patron's mind from the comparison of products to other non-
business considerations.32 It is selling chance, not merchandise.
Some courts will strive to find consideration to support a lottery
in the slightest detriment to a contestant,"' and freely grant an
injunction or prosecute a game. Other courts will demand a mone-
tary consideration for the chance to win, and hence rarely enjoin
an advertising scheme as a lottery.8 4 But it is submitted that the
Getty decision should be followed. Given a regulatory statute, the
mere existence of a game, even absent consideration, is unfair to
business competitors. A non-participating dealer is forced to either
watch his business falter, or to engage in a reprehensible trade
practice to remain competitive.3 5 Ultimately, expenditures for the
games and contests only create a rise in product cost to the con-
suming public.36  For the same reasons, when a criminal lottery
statute is the basis for the injunctive suit, the essential elements of
a lottery should be as freely defined as the Getty's arguendo con-
clusions.3 7 Perhaps if the Getty decision is followed we may es-
cape the sale of games and return to the sale of merchandise.
JAY W. L~wis
31. Federal Trade Commission v. R. F. Keppel & Bro., Inc., 291 U.S.
304 (1934).
32. Testimony of a retail dealer in the Getty case, for example, indicated
"that on several occasions motorists drove into his service station at a time
when he was not sponsoring a giveaway contest and that upon observing that
his competitor across the street advertised a game, they left his station
without making a purchase and drove into the competitior's station where
they bought motor fuel." United Stations v. Getty Oil Co., 102 N.J. Super.
459, 470, 246 A.2d 150, 156 (1968).
33. See, e.g., Lucky Calendar Co. v. Cohn, 19 N.J. 399, 117 A.2d 487
(1955), where consideration was found merely in the detriment to contest-
ant of having to deposit coupon at businessman's store.
34. See note 20 supra.
35. Testimony in Getty indicated that though one dealer thought the
games a "disgrace to the oil industry," he was forced to sponsor a contest
or see his business decline. United Stations v. Getty Oil Co., 102 N.J.
Super. 459, 471, 246 A.2d 150, 156 (1968); Federal Trade Commission v.
R.F. Keppel & Bro., Inc., 291 U.S. 304 (1934); General Theatres v. Metro-
Goldwyn-Mayer Distributing Corp., 9 F. Supp. 546 (D. Colo. 1935).
36. 114 CONG. REC. E5909 (daily ed. June 27, 1968).
37. See note 29 supra and accompanying text.
BUILDING PERMITS-VESTED RIGHTS THEREUNDER
IN PENNSYLVANIA-A NEW RULE
Gallagher v. Building Inspector City of Erie, 247 A.2d 572 (Pa. 1968).
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Gallagher v. Building
Inspector City of Erie' has held that a landowner who receives in
good faith a building permit before any action toward a zoning
change has begun, acquires a vested interest in the permit even
though he has neither spent money nor incurred liability in re-
liance upon the permit. This decision appears to change the Penn-
sylvania law regarding vested rights in building permits. How-
ever, the court distinguished cases which required substantial ex-
penditures in reliance upon a permit since they involved a "race"
to acquire vested rights before the zoning amendment was enacted.
In Gallagher, building permits for the construction of town
houses were issued to the plaintiff on December 12, 1966. Be-
cause of protests by neighboring landowners, the permits were sus-
pended in January, 1967. The plaintiff's land was then rezoned on
March 9, 1967, to prohibit the construction of town houses, and eight
days later the building permits were revoked. The supreme court
affirmed the lower court's order to re-issue the permits.
PREREQUISITES TO VESTED RIGHTS
A permit can be revoked if it is repugnant to a subsequent
zoning law when the permittee has not acquired any vested right
thereunder.2 To acquire a vested right in a permit in Penn-
sylvania, a permittee generally must apply in good faith for a
permit, obtain a permit valid under the existing zoning law, and
expend substantial money or incur substantial liabilities in good
faith reliance upon the permit.3
Pennsylvania first recognized the doctrine of vested rights in
Herskovits v. Irwin:
4
Where a permit to build has been acted upon and the owner
has proceeded to incur obligations, and in good faith to
erect the building, rights are then vested, property rights,
protected by the Federal and State Constitutions.
1. 247 A.2d 572 (Pa. 1968).
2. 101 C.J.S. Zoning § 244 (1958).
3. Penn Twp. v. Yecko Bros., 420 Pa. 386, 217 A.2d 171 (1966).
4. 299 Pa. 155, 149 A. 195 (1930).
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A permittee's good faith is crucial to the vesting of rights in a
permit. If the court feels that the permittee has raced in bad
faith to acquire vested rights in a building permit before the pend-
ing zoning law was enacted, no rights will vest.5 A permittee
acquires no vested rights if he subsequently uses the structure
illegally.0 If the permittee incurs obligations in bad faith7 or fails
to construct the building in compliance with the permit,8 no rights
will vest.
Most Pennsylvania courts have decided that the permittee can
acquire no vested rights until he receives a duly issued permit.9
Neither an unofficial letter of approval from a zoning board10 nor
the mere application for a permit 1 confers a vested right in the
permit.
A permittee acquires no vested right by virtue of the permit
alone. He must have made a substantial beginning in the con-
struction of the building before the enactment of the pending
ordinance for rights to vest.12 The following have been held not
to constitute a substantial beginning: the examination of the prem-
ises to determine the amount of materials and the number of men
needed to build the structure;" the expenditure of $2,000 toward a
construction cost of $300,000;' 4 the expenditure of $1,200 toward a
construction project costing $150,000;' 5 and contracting for ma-
terials and the construction. 8 The following have been held to
be a substantial beginning: a tangible change of the property by
5. Honeybrook Twp. v. Alenovitz, 430 Pa. 614, 243 A.2d 330 (1968);
Penn Twp. v. Fratto, 430 Pa. 487, 244 A.2d 39 (1968); Penn Twp. v. Yecko
Bros, 420 Pa. 386, 217 A.2d 171 (1966); Aberman, Inc. v. City of New Ken-
sington, 377 Pa. 520, 105 A.2d 586 (1954); In re A. N. "Ab" Young Co. Zoning
Case, 360 Pa. 429, 61 A.2d 839 (1948).
6. Meyers v. Board of Adjustment, 295 Pa. 310, 149 A.2d 730 (1963);
Philadelphia v. Wyszynski, 381 Pa. 153, 122 A.2d 89 (1955).
7. Schechter v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 395 Pa. 310, 149 A.2d 28
(1959).
8. Kovacs v. Ross Twp. Bd. of Adjustment, 173 Pa. Super. 66 (1952).
9. See, e.g., Harrisburg v. Pass, 372 Pa. 318, 94 A.2d 748 (1953);
Dunlap Appeal, 370 Pa. 31, 87 A.2d 299 (1952); In re "Ab" Young Zoning
Case, 360 Pa. 429, 61 A.2d 839 (1948); cf. American Veteran Housing
Cooperative, Inc. v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 69 Pa. D. & C. 449 (1949).
10. Zupanic v. Snowden Twp., 387 Pa. 135, 127 A.2d 461 (1956).
11. Mutual Supply Co. Appeal, 366 Pa. 424, 77 A.2d 612 (1951); Gheen
v. Mencer, 52 Pa. D. & C. 422 (1945).
12. Gheen v. Mencer, 52 Pa. D. & C. 422 (1945).
13. Schechter v. Zoning Board of Adjustment, 395 Pa. 310, 149 A.2d 28
(1959).
14. Honeybrook Twp. v. Alenovitz, 430 Pa. 614, 243 A.2d 330 (1968).
15. Hunter v. Richter, 9 Pa. D. & C.2d 58 (1955).
16. Panas v. Millcreek Twp. Bd. of Adjustment, 72 Pa. D. & C. 373
(1950).
excavation and construction;17 the destruction of existing structures
plus the contracting for the construction of the building; 8 con-
struction sufficiently substantial to preclude all but the intended
use of the property; 19 loss of the opportunity to profitably sell
the property;20 and the contracting for extensive work on the
structure.2 Thus some expenditures or liabilities must be in-
curred, and how much depends on the circumstances.
22
A permit must be issued when the intended structure con-
forms to existing zoning laws, and mandamus is available to force
its issuance.2 A permit cannot be denied because the structure
may be rendered useless by a subsequent injunction 24 or because
it does not conform with the character of the neighborhood.
25
A permit may be refused if its intended use is repugnant to a
pending,2 later enacted zoning ordinance.2 7  However, this rule
presupposes that the pending zoning ordinance tends to enhance
the property covered 28 and is not an attempt at special legis-
lation.
29
In Gallagher, the permittee applied for and received a permit
in good faith before the zoning amendment was pending. The
court stated that all previous Pennsylvania cases which required
substantial expenditure in reliance upon the permit, involved appli-
cations made in bad faith after a zoning amendment was pending.80
17. Clarks Appeal, 37 Pa. D. & C. 670 (1939).
18. Kahn v. Seeds, No. 2, 20 Pa. D. & C. 365 (1934); Kahn v. Seeds,
No. 1, 20 Pa. D. & C. 361 (1934).
19. Dunlap Appeal, 370 Pa. 31, 87 A.2d 299 (1952).
20. Lhormer v. Bowen, 410 Pa. 508, 188 A.2d 747 (1963).
21. Klein Appeal, 395 Pa. 157, 149 A.2d 114 (1959).
22. American Veteran Housing Cooperative v. Zoning Bd. of Adjust-
ment, 69 Pa. D. & C. 449 (1949); Kahn v. Seeds, No. 1, 20 Pa. D. & C. 361
(1934).
23. Vagoni v. Bridgeport Council, 420 Pa. 411, 218 A.2d 235 (1966);
Shapiro v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 377 Pa. 621, 105 A.2d 299 (1954);
Harrisburg v. Pass, 372 Pa. 318, 94 A.2d 748 (1953); Clarks Appeal, 37 Pa.
D. & C. 670 (1939).
24. Coyne v. Prichard, 272 Pa. 424, 116 A. 315 (1922).
25. Wright v. France, 279 Pa. 22, 123 A. 586 (1924).
26. Where there was neither public hearings nor a public declaration
of the zoning amendment before the application for the permit, the amend-
ment was not pending and the application could not be refused in reliance
upon it. Lhormer v. Bowen, 410 Pa. 508, 188 A.2d 747 (1963). Where an
amendment had been read two of the three required times, it was pending,
land the board rightfully rejected the application for a permit in reliance
upon it. Gold v. Bldg. Comm'r of Warrenboro, 334 Pa. 10, 5 A.2d 367 (1939).
27. Commercial Properties v. Peternal, 418 Pa. 304, 211 A.2d 452 (1965);
Lhormer v. Bowen, 410 Pa. 508, 188 A.2d 747 (1963); Logan v. Bickel, 11
Pa. D. & C.2d 405, 43 De. 272 (1958).
28. Appeal of Hertrick, 391 Pa. 148, 137 A.2d 310 (1958); Lower Merion
Twp. v. Frankel, 358 Pa. 430, 57 A.2d 900 (1948); American Veteran Housing
Cooperative v. Zoning Ed. of Adjustment, 69 Pa. D. & C. 449 (1949).
29. Commercial Properties v. Peternal, 418 Pa. 304, 211 A.2d 452 (1965);
Shapiro v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 377 Pa. 621, 105 A.2d 299 (1954).
30. Penn Twp. v. Fratto, 430 Pa. 487, 244 A.2d 39 (1968); Honeybrook
Twp. v. Alenovitz, 430 Pa. 614, 243 A.2d 330 (1968); Penn Twp. v. Yecko
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However, in Clarks Appeal8 ' the permittee applied for and re-
ceived in good faith a permit to construct a gas station. Seventeen
days later the zoning adminstration obtained a restraining order
preventing the permittee to construct the gas station while the
issuance of the permit was being appealed. The court held that
since the permittee did nothing during the seventeen days in re-
liance upon the permit, no rights vested in the permit. And in
Lower Merion Twp. v. Frankel82 the permittee applied for and
received in good faith a permit to construct an apartment house.
The court said in dictum 3s that the permittee acquired a vested
right in the permit because of his substantial expenditures in re-
liance upon the permit before the existing zoning law was repealed.
Shapiro v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment 4 and Herskovits v. Ir-
win8 5 are cited by Gallagher to support its holding that no ex-
penditures need be made in reliance upon the permit when the
application was made in complete good faith. However, in both
cases the permittee spent money in reliance upon the permit.8 6
Gallagher can of course be distinguished from cases where the
permittee acted in bad faith. However, the cases which have in-
volved bad faith have held that even substantial expenditures in
reliance upon the permit will not create a vested right in the
permit.3 7
Bros., 420 Pa. 386, 217 A.2d 171 (1966); Aberman, Inc. v. City of Kensington,
377 Pa. 520, 105 A.2d 586 (1954); In re A. N. "Ab" Young Co. Zoning Case,
360 Pa. 429, 61 A.2d 839 (1948); Gold v. Bldg. Comm'r of Warrenboro, 334
Pa. 10 5 A.2d 367 (1939).
31. 37 Pa. D. & C. 670 (1939).
32. 358 Pa. 430, 57 A.2d 900 (1948).
33. The court held the amendment to be discriminatory against the
permittee and thus void as special legislation.
34. 377 Pa. 621, 105 A.2d 299 (1954).
35. 299 Pa. 155, 149 A. 195 (1930).
36. Indeed, the defendants [Zoning Bd. of Adjustment] concede
that Shapiro made expenditures and incurred liabilities in connec-
tion with his proposed use of the land, that such expenditures
and liabilities were substantial in amount and that they were made
or incurred before the enactment of the amendatory zoning ordi-
nance .... The expenditures and liabilities were not made nor
incurred until the permits had issued as a matter of right under
existing law pursuant to the order of court.
Shapiro v. Zoning Board of Adjustment, 377 Pa. 621, 629, 105 A.2d 299, 303
(1954). In Herskovits v. Irwin, 299 Pa. 155, 149 A. 195 (1930) the issue was
whether the permittee in only laying the foundation for the building in-
curred a sufficient expense in reliance upon the permit to obtain a vested
right therein. The court held that a property interest arises where, after a
permit is granted, a landowner begins construction of a building and incurs
liability for future work.
37. See, e.g., Honeybrook Twp. v Alenovitz, 430 Pa. 614, 243 A.2d 330
That the permittee in Gallagher would suffer substantial losses
through his inability to profitably sell his property cannot be
denied. But a zoning ordinance need not permit each owner to
make maximum use of his property. 8 With zoning, the general
welfare of the public is more important than the pecuniary profits
of an individual landowner.3
Support for the holding of Gallagher can be found in Hull
v. Hunt: 40
Notwithstanding the great weight of authority, we prefer
to have a date certain upon which the right vests to con-
struct in accordance with the building permit. We prefer
not to adopt a rule which forces the court to search through
... 'the moves and countermoves of.. . parties ... by way
of passing ordinance and bringing actions for injunctions'
. ..to which may be added the stalling or acceleration of
administrative action in the issuance of permits ... to
find that date upon which the substantial change of posi-
tion is made which finally vests the right. The more prac-
tical rule to administer, we feel, is that the right vests when
the party, property owner or not, applies for his permit, if
that permit is thereafter issued.
A greater certainty will result from the holding in Gallagher.
But in achieving this greater certainty, it is submitted that the
courts may be ignoring the policy behind the vested rights doc-
trine, which is an estoppel against the municipality. 4 It is the
change of position, in the form of investment, expenditures or work,
made in reliance upon the permit which creates property rights
entitled to the protection of the law.42 It is submitted also that the
elimination of the requirement of a change in position in reliance
upon the building permit will allow the creation of non-conforming
uses after the effective date of the pending zoning ordinance.
ROBERT H. DUNLAP
(1968); Penn Twp. v. Fratto, 430 Pa. 487, 244 A.2d 39 (1968); Penn Twp. v.
Yecko Bros., 420 Pa. 386, 217 A.2d 171 (1966); Aberman v. City of New
Kensington, 377 Pa. 520, 105 A.2d 586 (1954); In re "Ab" Young Co. Zoning
Case, 360 Pa. 429, 61 A.2d 839 (1948).
38. Dunlap Appeal, 370 Pa. 31, 87 A.2d 299 (1952).
39. 1 YOKELEY, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 133 (1956).
40. 53 Wash. 2d 125, 130, 331 P.2d 856, 859 (1958). Delaware has
refused to follow this minority rule because the advantages of certainty
are not sufficient to counterbalance the fundamental principles of estoppel.
Shellburne, Inc. v. Roberts, 224 A.2d 250 (Del. 1966).
41. B. LEIBERMAN AND W. RABIN, THE LAW OF ZONING IN PENNSYLVANIA
(1958).
42. MCQUILLEN, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 26.215 (1964).
